In order to be able to benefit from the guarantees of rule of law protected by the Supreme Courts with regard to particular judicial proceedings concerning their rights and obligations, individuals first and foremost need to be able to exercise their right of access to those courts. Without the possibility of bringing their cases before Supreme Courts, the guarantees of rule of law vested in those highest national judicial authorities remain tenuous.
Scope of and limitations to right of access to appellate and cassation courts
Right of access to a court (particularly right of access to courts of higher instances), as guaranteed under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on Human Rights, is, however, not without its limitations.
Article 6 of the Convention on Human Rights does not compel the contracting states to set up courts of appeal or of cassation. The formation of the national judicial system naturally infers on the states a certain margin of appreciation, allowing them to organise their systems in a manner they see fit. Nevertheless, a State, which does set up courts of appeal or courts of cassation is required to ensure the respect for fundamental guarantees contained in Article 6 to all those who appear before them 2 .
Different models of Supreme Court jurisdictions in member states of the Council of Europe
The states' margin of appreciation in organising their judicial systems with particular regard to the highest levels of jurisdiction is particularly evident through the existence of different models set up within the Council of Whatever the model, one of the main features that distinguishes the Supreme Courts from lower (ordinary) courts is the fact that Supreme
Courts are on the top of the judicial hierarchy. They are therefore expected to "clarify the law, assure its uniform application and adapt the national case-law to ever-changing circumstances" 7 .
Precisely because of their special role in the national legal systems, the defined as "achieving, to the maximum possible extent, the application of justice according to law to the parties to the litigation before the court" 9 .
On the other hand, their public purpose is perceived as wider-reaching, through the reviews of the legality of the lower courts' decisions and the fact that, the lower courts are ordinarily bound by the precedents and Limitations of access to the Supreme Courts (filtering mechanisms and models)
The European Court has, on many occasions, held that, "[t]he right of access to the court… is not absolute; it is subject to limitations permitted by implication, in particular where the conditions of admissibility of an appeal are concerned, since by its very nature it calls for regulation by the State, which enjoys a certain margin of appreciation in this regard" 11 .
Limitations of right of access to Supreme Courts have their practical expression in the form of filtering mechanisms and procedures to be followed in order for a case to be eligible for examination at this, highest level of national jurisdiction.
Filtering mechanisms, models and procedure vary from one country to another. They generally depend on the functioning model of the Supreme Court and its legal position in the national judicial order (in particular with regard to whether a Constitutional Court has also been set up in the country). The second model of filtration of the appeals to the Supreme Court includes no judicial filtration stricto sensu. This type of filtration exists in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Estonia, Spain, Greece and Italy.
In these countries, the cassation appeal may be brought before the Supreme Court only by a special lawyer assigned to the Supreme Court or one who fulfils certain prescribed requirements of experience. It is, in principle, mandatory for practising lawyers to advise their clients on the possible outcomes and thus act as a type of filter for unfounded appeals to the Supreme Court 13 .
The third model may be described as a mixed one. It possesses some of the features of both models, occasionally shifting more either to the leave to appeal or to no judicial filtration system. This model is, for example, present in Lithuania.
Jurisdiction model and filtering mechanisms of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia
Government in the Republic of Croatia is based on the trias politica principle of separation of powers into legislative, executive and judicial branches. Judicial power is exercised by the courts. The judiciary is autonomous and independent. The courts administer justice according to the Constitution, international agreements and treaties, which have been signed and ratified and therefore form an integral part of the domestic legal system, laws and other valid sources of law.
The administration of justice in the Republic of Croatia is carried out by courts, including the misdemeanour courts, municipal courts, commercial courts, administrative courts, county courts, the High Misdemeanour Court, the High Administrative Court, the High Commercial Court and, of course, the Supreme Court, as the highest court.
The role of the Supreme Court is to assure the protection of the rule of law and all the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. One of its most important roles, inter alia, is ensuring the uniform application of laws and equal treatment of all citizens before the law. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia discusses current issues related to court practice, decides on admissibility and merits of the regular or extraordinary legal remedies in accordance with provisions of national law and decides upon jurisdictional disputes between lower Croatian courts. The Supreme Court also performs other tasks as prescribed by law 14 .
The Supreme Court performs its function of the guardian of the rule of law (ensuring uniform application of laws and equality of all citizens) mainly through its decisions on appeals. Its decisions in specific cases influence the practice and decision making of the lower courts 15 .
The achievement of goals set before the Supreme Court and the role it performs in the Croatian legal system is directly connected to the regime of legal remedies, which afford access to the Supreme Court. It is precisely because of its special role and position within the Croatian legal system hierarchy, that not all cases and appeals may be examined before the Supreme Court on merits. The qualities of realisation of the goals set before the Supreme Court are intrinsic to the possibility of access to the Supreme Court by parties. The Supreme Court would be equally prevented from performing its functions if the parties had no possibility of access to the Supreme Court, but also if such possibility was too broad based. In both of these situations the result would be similar -failure and impossibility of the Supreme Court to fulfil its constitutional assignment -to harmonize the domestic courts' practice and thus influence the consequent development of the domestic law.
Similar to the previously described filtering methods and procedures existent before other European Supreme Courts, the possibility of access to the Croatian Supreme Court is also subject to restrictions. In civil cases, the Supreme Court normally decides upon appeal on points of law (ordinary or "extraordinary"), which has to be filed after the second instance court has brought its (final) decision. Other elements of admissibility are defined through provisions of national civil procedural law imposing specific restrictions on the right of access. of justice, as it prevented litigants from using an available remedy.
In the case Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, the Court deemed
that access to the Supreme Court had been denied based on an unreasonable construction of a procedural requirement, which prevented a claim for compensation from being examined on its merits. In this case, the applicants lodged an administrative complaint to the Supreme Court, which was dismissed because it had been lodged outside the time-limit, namely, after the expiry of one year since the delivery of the impugned decision. However, the applicants were not parties in the proceedings in which the decision was taken, and, furthermore, were unaware of it until it was published in the Official Gazette, although the decision itself did concern their interests. The European Court has emphasized that the applicants "must be able to avail themselves of the possibility to lodge an appeal from the moment they can effectively apprise themselves of court decisions imposing a burden on them or which may infringe their legitimate rights or interests" 22 . Otherwise, the courts could substantially reduce the time for lodging an appeal or even render any appeal impossible by delaying service of their decisions. On such basis, the European Court concluded that domestic courts' particularly strict interpretation of a procedural rule, deprived the applicants of the right of access to a court.
The issue of deadlines for filing applications to the supreme judicial authority has also been considered by the Court in the case of Tence v. In a number of cases concerning access to supreme jurisdictions, the European Court has also dealt with the issues of the rationae valoris criteria applied in many European legal systems as one of the filters for accessing supreme jurisdictions. In that regard, the European Court has held that setting the financial threshold for appeals to the Supreme Court is not contrary to Convention per se, as it pursues a legitimate aim of preventing overload of the Supreme Court with cases of lesser importance 25 . However, the issue of whether the interpretation of the rationae valoris rule, in light of the circumstances of a particular case infringed the right of access to the supreme jurisdiction, remains to be examined on a case-by-case basis.
Recent judgment of the European Court in the case of Zubac v. Croatia
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concerns the lack of access to a court due to a combination of two factors: a mistake made by lower instance courts and, subsequently, an exceedingly formalistic interpretation of procedural rules governing the rationae valoris principle by the Supreme Court. In particular, under relevant Croatian legislation the plaintiff is obliged to indicate the value of his claim in his action. Should he fail to do so, or should the first instance court find that the value stated in the action is clearly incorrect (set either too high or too low), it shall verify the value of the claim at the early stages of the proceedings, before examination of the merits. In his initial action, the applicant's predecessor indicated the value of his claim lower than the rationae valoris threshold for filing the appeal on points of law.
Subsequently, during the first instance proceedings on merits, he raised the initially indicated value over the prescribed rationae valoris threshold, even though he was not permitted to do so under national legislation.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court declared his appeal on points of law inadmissible as not meeting the rationae valoris criteria.
However, the European Court held that the particular circumstances of the case (specifically the fact that the lower courts had calculated costs and expenses of proceedings using the raised value of the claim) lead to the conclusion that the interpretation of procedural rules by the Supreme Court had been overly rigid, in a manner, which imposed on the applicant an excessive individual burden of mistakes made by the lower courts and prevented his access to the Supreme Court.
It is interesting to note that the European Court held that existence of longterm case-law of the Supreme Court with regard to the rationae valoris principle, consistent with the Supreme Court's conclusion on inadmissibility of the applicant's appeal on points of law, was of no relevance. This was so because, in the European Court's view, the inadmissibility of the appeal on points of law was essentially caused by the errors made by It is further worth noting that the Chamber adopted the Zubac judgment by four votes to three. In a joint dissenting opinion, honourable judges
Lemmens, Griţko and Ravarani found there was no reason to hold that conclusions of the Supreme Court had been contrary to the Convention.
In particular, the Supreme Court could not be bound by the (implicit) determination of lower courts with regard to the value of the claim, but rather relied on specific provisions of domestic law and its own longstanding case-law in dismissing the appeal on points of law in this particular case. Dissenting opinion especially critiques the notion of "general procedural fairness inherent in Article 6 § 1", which was introduced by the majority. Finding this new notion unclear, the minority questioned its connection to the right of access to a court as the only right at issue in this particular case.
Moreover, the minority questioned the majority conclusion that the case concerned mistakes made by national courts, since the initial mistake was in fact made by the applicant's predecessor who indicated a higher value of the claim at the stage of the proceedings at which such action was not allowed. Even though the lower courts did not declare such action unlawful, this could not have created a reasonable expectation of the applicant's predecessor that his appeal on points of law would have been admissible.
As the Croatian Government's request for referral of the Zubac case to the Grand Chamber of the European Court was accepted, it remains to be seen what the final outcome of the case will be.
At this point, the content of the European Court's case-law regarding the issue of access to the supreme jurisdictions shows that the examination of such cases has more to do with individual circumstances of each case (which are naturally of factual nature) than with any general notion, be it the right to a fair trial or "general procedural fairness inherent in Article 6 § 1", as stated in Zubac 27 .
Effect of the European Court's judgments on removing obstacles for access to supreme jurisdictions changes, either in the legislation governing the filtering of appeals to these jurisdictions or in the interpretation of these rules by the national courts of the Member State to which a particular judgment refers.
Generally speaking, the scope of measures that may be applied by the states in order to remove underlying causes of the violation of access to supreme jurisdictions is limited to, either legislative changes (when the violation was caused by the content of provisions of relevant domestic laws) or, more frequently, measures that can and should affect the necessary changes in the case-law of domestic courts examining the admissibility of applications lodged to Supreme Courts. 
Conclusion
Right of access to a court, guaranteed under Article 6 § 1 of the European Convention, though generally encompassing all levels of national jurisdiction, nonetheless shows some restrictions do apply.
However, such restrictions must not impair the very essence of the right of access to a court. In particular, the Court held that, in order to remain compatible with Article 6 of the Convention, restrictions of the right of access to a court must necessarily pursue a legitimate aim, and the means employed (the limitations placed on the right of access) must be proportionate to the aim pursued. This general rule is applicable to all levels of national jurisdiction, including highest judicial authorities (Supreme or Cassation Courts).
It will be interesting to see how the European Court's case-law will further develop on the issue, particularly in the case Zubac v. Croatia, which is currently pending before the Grand Chamber, which is expected to provide specific guidelines as to the application of the rationae valoris criteria in access to highest national courts. 
